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MIHAS v. UNITED STATES
Jennifer Fox
A. Subjective Perception of Complaining Witness Worth More Than Aens
Rea of Accused
In Mihas v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found
that mere words coupled with the conscious knowledge of possession of a knife
establishes the requisite acts of assault.2 The Court affirmed the trial court's
conviction on the charges of "intent-to-frighten assault"' and subsequent counts of
"possession of a prohibited weapon ' 4 and "carrying a dangerous weapon."' 0
The trial court found that it was the defendant's intent to possess a knife, in the
context of telling the complaining witness to be on his way, and that these acts
would cause apprehension to any person in the victim's position.7 Upon these
findings, the defendant was convicted of intent-to-frighten assault." The appellate
court agreed that the standard of proof for intent for assault is the defendant's
intent to do the acts which constitute the assault.0 The intent required for the
remaining charges of possession of a dangerous weapon and carrying a dangerous
weapon was then inferred from the intent to cause the assault.10
FACrUAL BACKGROUND.- On October 11, 1990, Paul Rinehart, the complaining
witness, was confronted by John Mihas, the accused, as Rinehart was walking
through an alley by his home in Cleveland Park." Mihas, sixty-one years old, lives
on the street and carries all of his possessions with him."2 Mihas approached
Rinehart with a knife in his hand, held at belt level, pointed downward in a fortyfive-degree angle, such that Rinehart could see it.13 The two men were within five

1. 618 A.2d 197 (D.C. 1992).
2. Id. at 201.

5.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1981).
D.C. CODE ANN § 22-3214(b) (1981).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204 (1981).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

618 A.2d at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
618 A.2d at 201.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.

3.

4.
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feet of each other.14 At this point Mihas said, "[W]hat are you looking at [ ]?
Your best bet is to keep on going," or "get out of here." 15 Rinehart left the alley
17
16
and reported the incident to the police. Mihas did not follow.

At trial, Mihas testified that he had his knife out and was using it to clean his
nails before he met Rinehart.18 Mihas said that he carried the knife because he
needed it to cut up his food as he only had two teeth.10
The trial court found the carrying of the knife was accompanied by several steps
in Rinehart's direction with commanding words and tone. Consequently, Mihas'
actions constituted a menacing threat, although not with specific intent to injure. 0
The trial court found that Mihas had the apparent present ability to hurt
Rinehart, that any person in the position of Rinehart would have felt concern for
21
his safety, and that Mihas intended to act as he did.
The trial court found Mihas guilty of assault under D.C. Code Ann. Section 22504,22 possession of a prohibited weapon under D.C. Code Ann. Section 223214(b),2 3 and carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon under D.C. Code Ann.
Section 22-3204,24 and sentenced him to time served.2 5 Mihas appealed and the
2
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 0

14. Id.
15. 618 A.2d at 199.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Trial Tr. 3/6/91, at 28, lines 5-9.
20. Mihas. 618 A.2d at 200.
21. Id.
22. D.C CODE ANN § 22-504 states "whoever unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a mcnancing
manner shall be fined not more than $500 or be imprisioned not more than 12 months, or both."
The elements are:
1) That the defendant made an attempt or effort, with force or violence, to do injury lo the person of
another;
2) That at the time he made such an attempt or effort, he had the apparant present ability to effect such an
injury; and
3) That, at the time of the commission of the assault, he intended to do the acts which constituted the
assault. Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975 (D.C. 1982).
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3214(b) (1981) states, "no person shall within the District of Columbia
possess, with intention to use unlawfully against another. . . [a] knife with a blade longer than 3 inches. . ."
24. D.C. CODE ANN § 22-3204 (1981) states, "no person shall within the District of Columbia carry
either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other
land possessed by him . . .any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed...
25. Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201.
26. Id. at 199.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND. The appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient for
the trial judge to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any of the crimes

charged: simple assault, carrying a dangerous weapon and possession of a
prohibited weapon.
In evaluating the sufficiency.of the evidence, the court must, "[r]eview the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, recognizing the factfinder's
role in weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of the witnesses, and
drawing justifiable inferences from the evidence."27 The evidence must be such
that "reasonable persons Could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a
requirement that the evidence 'Compel, but only that it is Capable of or sufficient
to persuade the jury to reach a verdict of guilt by the requisite standard.""a
Reversal of Mihas' conviction then, would be, only where there is "no evidence
upon which a reasonable mind could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."2'
Furthermore, "[t]he evidence must support an inference, rather than a mere
speculation, as to each element of an offense."3 0
II. Assault- D.C. Code Ann. Section 22-504 states that the three essential
elements of assault are as follows:
First, there must be an act on the part of the defendant; mere words do not
constitute an assault. The act does not have to result in injury; it can be either
an actual attempt, with force or violence, to injure another, or a menacing
threat, which may or may not be accompanied by a specific intent to injure,
on the part of the defendant. Second, at the time the defendant commits the
act, the defendant must have the apparent present ability to injure the victim.
Third, at the time the act is committed, the defendant must have the intent to
perform the acts which constitute the assault."1
There are several types of assault in the District of Columbia including:
"attempted-battery" type, "which requires proof of an attempt to cause a physical

27. Ford v. United States. 498 A.2d 1135, 1137. (D.C. 1985). See also. Sousa v. United States. 400
A.2d 1036. 1043 (D.C. 1979).
28. Sousa at 1043 (quoting, United States v. Harris, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 270. 284. 435 F.2d 74, 88
(1970). cert.
denied, 402 US. 986, 91 S.Ct. 1675. 29 L.Ed.2d 152 (1971)) (emphasis in original).
29. Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572. 573 (D.C. 1986) (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. D.C CODE ANN § 22-504 (1981); Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975 (D.C 1982);
Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572 (D.C. 1986).
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injury", and an "attempt-to-frighten" type, "which requires proof of intent either
to cause injury or to create apprehension in the victim by threatening conduct." 32 1
Mihas was convicted of "intent-to-frighten" assault which is also known as simple
assault.33 Because assault is a general intent crime, the element of intent can be
proven by showing that a defendant intended to do the acts which constitute the
assault.4 Thus, if the acts which constitute the assault are volitional, intent to
cause an assault is proven.
Additionally, the prosecution need not show the victim experienced apprehension
or fear. The question is whether the defendant acted in such a manner as would,
under the circumstances, portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of
reasonable sensibility. 5 In Robinson v. United States,6 the defendant was
convicted of simple assault after pointing a loaded gun at a police officer. The
defendant argued that because of the police officer's training, the victim was not
actually in fear, thus no assault had occurred. The court re-iterated its holding in
Anthony v. United States,3 7 stating that the victim need not necessarily show
apprehension or fear to establish the offense.3
III. Carrying a Dangerous Weapon (CDW)- Carrying a dangerous weapon, is
set forth in D.C. Code 1981 Section 22-3204 as follows: "No person shall within
the District of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or about his person,
except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him,
.. .or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed . . ."8 In
Degree v. United States,40 the defendant was charged with CDW for openly
carrying a knife with a blade four-and-one-half inches long. The defendant argued
that carrying a knife is not covered by Section 22-3204, but by Section 3214(b),
which makes it unlawful for any person in the District to possess a knife with a
41
blade longer than three inches, with intent to use it unlawfully against another.
The court explained that according to the legislative history of the District's
weapons laws, Congress enacted Section 22-3214 simultaneously with Section 2232. Supra note 29.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1981).
34. Smith v. United States, 593 A.2d 205, 206 (D.C. 1991).
35. Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1976).
36. 506 A.2d 572 (D.C. 1976).
37. 361 A.2d 202 (D.C. 1976).
38.
39.

Id. at 205.
Degree v. United States. 144 A.2d 547, 548-49 (D.C. 1958).

40.

144 A.2d 547 (D.C. 1958).

41. Id. at 549.
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3204 as part of the same act with the express purpose of strengthening the existing
law.42 Congress' objective was to "provide 'tighter controls over the possession of
dangerous weapons' ".'1 In explaining the distinctions between the two sections,
the court said:
The later one (3214) prohibits the possession anywhere of certain weapons,
including a knife with a blade longer than three inches, with intent to use it
unlawfully against another . . . [S]ection (3204) . . makes it a crime for a
person to carry, elsewhere than in his own home or land or place of business,
either openly or concealed, a deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being
concealed. This section requires no proof of unlawful intent."
Thus, the court held the government is not required to bring all knife cases under
Section 22-3214 and a conviction under Section 22-3204 was appropriate.'
When charged under Section 22-3204 with carrying a dangerous weapon, the
defendant then agrees that the government failed to prove the object is a
dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute. The test for determining the
dangerousness of a weapon is whether, under the circumstances, the purpose of
carrying the object is its use as a weapon.4" Additionally, courts have defined a
dangerous weapon as "one which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury
by the use made of it.' 47 Some items in and of themselves have been held to be
inherently dangerous including "particularly menacing knives."' 0 But not all
knives are per se dangerous weapons 0 and Section 22-3204 does not prohibit the
carrying of knives for legitimate purposes.50 The court in Strong" affirmed that an
object not inherently dangerous can become so in its use as a weapon. Strong set
forth the following factors to consider in determining whether a person intends to

41 Id. at 549.
43. Degree at 549, quoting, House Report No. 3244. 81st Congress. filed January 2. 1951. House
Report No. 538, 82nd Congress. filed May 31, 1951; Senate Report No. 1989. 82nd Congress. June 30. 1952.
44. Degree v. United States, 144 A.2d 547. 549 (D.C. 1958) (quoting. United States v. Shannon.
D.C.Mun.App., 144 A.2d 267).
45. Degree, 144 A.2d at 549.
46. Nelson v. United States. 280 A.2d 531. 533 (D.C. 1971).
47. Strong v. United States, 581 A.2d 383. 386 (D.C. 1990). quoting. Scott v United States. 243 A.2d
54. 56. (D.C. 1968).
48. Strong. 581 A.2d at 386.
49. Degree v. United States. 144 A.2d 547 (D.C. 1958).
50. Scott v. United States, 243 A.2d 54. 56 (D.C. 1968).
51. Strong, 581 A.2d at 386.
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use an object as a weapon: "1) the design of the instrument; 2) the conduct of the
defendant prior to his arrest; 3) any physical alteration of the object; and, 4) the
52
time and place of its possession.
IV. Possession of a prohibited weapon (PPW)- Under D.C. CODE Section 223214(b) the relevant section provides that no person in the District shall possess
with intent to use unlawfully against another,". . . [a] knife with a blade longer
than three inches, or any other dangerous weapon."' "The government must
establish not only that the accused possessed a prohibited article, but also that he
possessed it with intent to use it unlawfully against another."'" In Brooks, 5 the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the lower court's ruling that wrongly
focused solely on the possession of a thick table leg, holding that it did not
constitute possession of a prohibited weapon as set forth in the statute. The
appellate court explained that it is possession, coupled with intent to use in an
assaultive or unlawful manner, which constitutes the offense under Section 223214(b).5 6 The specific intent required for PPW allows various defenses, including
that possession of the instrument was wholly innocent or for a lawful purpose. 7
LEGAL REASONING.-

In Mihas, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

affirmed, two to one, the lower court's conviction on all three counts, finding
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable mind might find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.58
On appeal, Mihas argued that there was insufficient evidence to show that he
committed an act which would constitute an assault or that he had the necessary
criminal intent to cause the injury or apprehension as required for a conviction of
assault. 59 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that Mihas'
question, "What are you looking at?" followed by an instruction to "Get out of
here," while approaching Rinehart with knife in hand, supported a finding of
simple assault. Regarding the requisite intent, the lower court found that Mihas
consciously held the knife while speaking in a commanding tone to Rinehart;

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
United States v. Brooks, 330 A.2d 245, 246 (D.C. 1974).

Id.
330 A.2d 245 (D.C. 1974).
Id. at 246-7.
McBride v. United States, 441 A.2d 644, 649 (D.C. 1982).
Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201.
Br. for Appellant at I.
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therefore, he intended to do the acts which constitute the assault. In affirming the
lower court's findings, the appeals court remarked that the crucial inquiry is
whether, "[a] person in Rinehart's position would have felt concern for his safety
"60

Next, Mihas argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to show that
Mihas' paring knife was a "deadly or dangerous weapon" or that his intent in
carrying it was for an unlawful purpose as required for both CDW and PDW.0 1
The trial court found that the requisite intent for the other charges consequently
flowed from that assault. The appellate court agreed that it was Mihas' intent to
carry the knife for a harmful purpose-the assault, when he "consciously" and
"knowingly", presented it to Rinehart in the context of telling him, "[t]o stop
looking at [him]" and "[tio get away from [him]." 2 This harmful purpose
enabled the appeals court to determine its use as a deadly or dangerous weapon, a
common element to both CDW and PPW. Finding that it was Mihas' specific
intent to use the knife to warn Rinehart, the court similarly established intent to
use the weapon unlawfully against another, a necessary element for PPW.3
ANALYSIS.- You are standing under a shaded tree in the park, casually slicing an

apple into small pieces. A man whom you do not know walks up to you and stares
at you oddly. Wanting only to enjoy your apple, you firmly order him to "stop
staring" at you and "leave me alone!" While your comments are seemingly
innocent, D.C. courts have held these actions to be tantamount to a criminal
assault. Mihas affirmed the trial court's explanation that it is "[a] violation of the
law to walk up to somebody, holding a knife, and order them around."11 Under
these facts, you could be convicted of simple assault although your intention was
only to make the stranger go away because of the knife coincidentally in your
hand.
Mihas illustrates how a conviction for an intent-to-frighten assault bears no
necessary relationship to one's criminal mens rea to cause the assault. Assault is a
general intent crime requiring only that one intended to perform the acts which
constitute the offense."5 This definition suggests that the acts need only be
volitional. Mihas' assault conviction is based on the court's finding that he
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Mihas, 618 A.2d at 200.
Br. for Appellant at 1-2.
Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
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intended to hold the knife while confronting the complaining witness with harsh
words. According to his trial testimony, Mihas did intend to hold the knife; he was
using it to clean his fingernails. 68 The law appears to require Mihas to stop
cleaning his nails and put the knife in his pocket to ensure safety from criminal
conviction. Inquiry about his criminal intent is inconsequential because proof of
67
specific intent to injure is unnecessary.
Mihas shifts the subjective inquiry from the mens rea of the accused, in doing
the acts which constitute the assault, to the victim's apprehension of fear. In his
dissent, Senior Judge Pryor recognized, "[m]ore attention has been given to the
complainant's perceptions than to the mens rea required of the appellant."0 0
Assault is one of the few criminal offenses which depends in part on the victim's
subjective perception as an element of the crime."0 Once shown that the defendant
intended to cause injury or create apprehension in the victim, "[t]he crucial
inquiry [is] whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the
circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable
sensibility. 70° Thus, if a person of "reasonable sensibility"71 would feel threatened
by Mihas' conduct, then it is appropriate to conclude this is conduct which creates
apprehension. Such an analysis focuses on the victim's subjective perceptions of
the accused acts. If this victim and similar victims would reasonably find these acts
induce a "well-founded apprehension of peril,"7 the result could be a conviction of
78
assault without regard to the mens rea of the accused.
The court's reasoning is completely counterintuitive of criminal convictions.
Society makes certain conduct punishable because the conduct itself is deemed
harmful and the accused has a criminal mind or criminal intent while engaging in
this conduct. A determination of an individual's criminal mind is necessary to
differentiate between those acts which are criminal in nature and those which are
merely inadvertant. The subjective standard applied by the court in simple assault
cases disregards the criminal intent traditionally required for a criminal conviction.
Mihas' confrontation exemplifies this result. Mihas is a homeless person, carrying
all of his possessions living in alleys and on sidewalks in Washington, D.C.

66. Trial Tr.. 3/6/91, at 31, lines 17-22.
67. Mihas at 199.
68. Id. at 202.
69. Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C. 1976).
70. Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572, 575 (D.C. 1986).
71. Id.
72. Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C. 1982).
73. Id.
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Unfortunately, the homeless are a part of Washington and most big cities. If this
confrontation with Mihas is enough to make reasonable people living in
Washington, D.C., feel "in peril," more convictions of this sort are likely to follow.
Another problem with Mihas and similar cases involving charges of assault
while carrying a dangerous weapon and possession of a prohibited weapon is, the
element of intent to use the weapon unlawfully necessary for carrying a dangerous
weapon follows from a factual finding of assault. The court in Mihas stated, "[t]he
element of Mihas' intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another person was
established by the factual finding that Mihas acted with the specific intent to use
the knife to warn Rinehart to be on his way, i.e., to use it in connection with the
assault upon Rinehart . . . . ,,74 Carrying a dangerous weapon involves openly
carrying a dangerous weapon, which is defined as an object carried for the purpose
of its use as a weapon.75 Once one is found guilty of assault (intending to cause
injury or apprehension), the court in Mihas then infers that the purpose of
carrying the object is its use in causing the assault.70 In finding possession of a
prohibited weapon, the court makes an even greater leap from the general intent of
assault to the specific intent to possess a prohibited object for an unlawful purpose.
Remember, for an assault one need not prove the specific intent to injure, and in
fact the trial court in Mihas found Mihas had no specific intent to injure.7
However, possession of a prohibited weapon does require the specific intent to use
the weapon unlawfully. Thus, courts infer the specific intent to use the weapon
unlawfully from the finding that one intended to cause injury or apprehension for
the assault. If charged on all three counts, courts therefore cannot find one guilty
of assault and not guilty of the other charges.
CONCLUSION.- Mihas turns the focus from the criminal mens rea of the accused

to the subjective perceptions of the victim in a case of simple assault. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that Mihas
intended to hold his knife while approaching Rinehart, asking him hostile
questions, and ordering him to leave.7 8 Thus, he intended to create apprehension in
Rinehart and in fact did cause apprehension by such conduct. Once this evidence
established the offense of simple assault, charges of carrying a dangerous weapon

74.

Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201.

75. Nelson, 280 A.2d at 533.
76.
77.
78.

Mihas, 618 A.2d at 201.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 199.
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and possession of a dangerous weapon easily followed. Because the court found
Mihas intended to carry the knife in order to assault Rinehart, that unlawful
purpose subsequently satisfied the elements of CDW and PPW.7 9 One assault
charge ended in three criminal convictions for essentially the same conduct.

79.

Id. at 201.

